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Abstract 
Existing literature suggests that while pursuing self-sufficiency 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) become vulnerable to mission drift as a result of 
increasingly targeting more well-off borrowers and foregoing their poorest clients. 
This thesis investigates whether or not the pursuance of operational self-
sufficiency tends to drive MFIs away from the poorest borrowers. This study 
employs panel least squares, fixed effects and random effects and uses one sample 
of 223 MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean and one sample of 196 MFIs in 
Asia from 2005-2009. The results show that while pursing operational self-
sufficiency all MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean are susceptible to 
mission drift. The results are less pronounced for Asia. 
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Glossary 
Term 
Assets 
Definition 
Total of all gross loans. 
Commercialization 
Cross-Subsidization 
Lending 
Average Loan Balance 
per Borrower 
Borrowers per Loan 
Officer 
Cost per Borrower 
Financial Self-Sufficiency 
Group Lending 
Individual Lending 
In a microfinance context, commercialization refers 
to the move by MFIs to provide services on a 
financially self-sufficient basis and under prevailing 
commercial principle and regulations. 
Consists of specifically targeting unbanked wealthier 
clientele. 
Loan Portfolio, Gross / Number of Active Borrowers 
Number of Active Borrowers / Number of Loan 
Officers 
Operating Expense/ Number of Active Borrowers , 
average 
A percentage which indicates whether or not enough 
revenue has been earned to cover both direct costs -
including financing costs, provisions for loan losses, 
and operating expenses - and indirect costs, 
including the adjusted cost of capital. 
Lending mechanism which allows a group of 
individuals - often called a solidarity group - to 
provide collateral or loan guarantee through a group 
repayment pledge. The incentive to repay the loan is 
based on peer pressure - if one group member 
defaults, the other group members make up the 
payment amount. 
Single-client lending where repayment relies solely 
on the individual. 
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Term 
Loan Portfolio, gross 
Micro-credit 
Microfinance Institution 
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Portfolio at Risk > [XX] 
days 
Progressive Lending 
Return on Assets (%) 
Return on Equity (%) 
Unbanked 
Yield on Gross Portfolio 
(nominal) (%) 
Definition 
All outstanding principals due for all outstanding 
client loans. This includes current, delinquent, and 
renegotiated loans, but not loans that have been 
written off. It does not include interest receivable. 
Another name for a micro-loan. A part of the field of 
microfinance, microcredit is the provision of credit 
services to low-income entrepreneurs. 
An institution that provides financial services to the 
world's poor. 
The number of individuals or entities who currently 
have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are 
primarily responsible for repaying any portion of the 
Loan Portfolio, Gross. Individuals who have multiple 
loans with an MFI should be counted as a single 
borrower. 
A percentage which indicates whether or not enough 
revenue has been earned to cover the MFIs total 
costs - operational expenses, loan loss provisions 
and financial costs. 
The value of all loans outstanding that have one or 
more instalments of principal past due more than 
[XX] days. 
Pertains to the notion that existing clientele are able 
to obtain higher loans after achieving a flawless 
repayment schedule. 
(Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/ Assets, average 
(Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/ Equity, average 
A term used to describe the world's working poor 
who are not able to participate in the formal banking 
sectors. 
Interest and Fees on Loan Portfolio/ Loan Portfolio, 
gross, average 
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Introduction 
The concept of micro-credit, pioneered by Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh in 1976, relates to the provision of financial 
services to the poor.1 The microfinance movement has encompassed all parts of 
the globe and has now reached approximately one hundred fifty million 
households worldwide. 2 In spite of the industry's double digit growth 
(approximately ten per cent), microfinance is estimated to satisfy only ten per cent 
of the entire global market demand (Dieckmann, 2007). Microfinance is now 
considered as a means of creating employment, enabling households to provide 
for education/health expenditures, reducing poverty, aiding households to 
smoothen consumption in the wake of unexpected economic shocks, promoting 
the bargaining power of women in the household, gender equality, creating social 
capital and promoting a bottom up growth process (Morduch, 2002; Khandekar, 
2005). For microfinance, however, the crucial aspect of the revolution is that it 
has the ability to provide large-scale outreach profitably (Robinson, 2002). 
The microfinance industry is a highly unique industry in the sense that it is 
theoretically subject to satisfying a double bottom line.3 In addition to maintaining 
a social or developmental mission recent literature has suggested that in order for 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to remain operational a movement away from the 
'Microfinance embraces not only small loans but includes savings, insurance, fund transfers and 
other related services. 
2http://microfinance.cgap.org/2010/05/17/microfinance-in-2010 ( Retrieved August 31, 2011) 
3Ibid 
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reliance on subsidies and donor support and towards that of financial self-
sustainability is required (Christen et al, 2004; ADA, 2009). Self-sustainability 
entails that microfinance institutions are to generate sufficient revenues through 
the provision of client services to cover the full cost of providing services. For 
those MFIs that have chosen to embrace the notion of self-sustainability, pursing 
profits has become an attractive vehicle for doing so (Cull et al, 2007; Berger et 
al, 2006). 
In recent years there has been considerable debate of whether or not the 
laudable goals of the double bottom line have been compromised as microfinance 
institutions allegedly shift away from serving the poorest borrowers in pursuit of 
commercial viability (Drake and Rhyne, 2002; Olivers-Polanco, 2005; Copestake, 
2007; Cull et al, 2007; Dichter andHarper, 2007; Hishigsuren, 2007;Mersaland 
and Strom, 2010). The emphasis on the pursuit of profits by microfinance 
institutions has provoked a heated debate between Mohammed Yunus, founder of 
Grameen Bank, and microfinance institutions that have formulated using various 
adaptations of the Grameen Bank model. The provocation for this debate began in 
1992 when PRODEM, a Bolivian non-governmental MFI, commercialized and 
transformed into a share-holder owned BancoSol. The initial public offering of 
Banco Compartamos in Mexico intensified the debate. Yunus advocated that 
microfinance institutions be social businesses driven explicitly by social missions 
and identified Banco Compartamos as a brutal money lender (Cull et al, 2009; 
Malkin, 2008).4 Yunus warns that by seeking commercial orientation the 
4http://www.compartamos.com/wps/portal/Inicio.Retrieved November 14, 2011. 
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microfinance industry is at risk of subverting from the original mission of poverty 
alleviation (Carrick and Santos, 2007). 
In recent years the increasing emphasis on financial sustainability rather 
than on social mission has led to allegations of mission drift (Sinha and Brar, 
2005; Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). However, existing studies have shown 
mixed results, with most actually showing little or no evidence of mission drift at 
all (Gonzalez-Vega et al, 1997; Rhyne 1998; Christen, 2001; Christen and Drake, 
2002; Mersland and Stram, 2010). Contradictory, indirect evidence provided by 
the global database Microfinance Information eXchange and from rating agencies 
for microfinance institutions show that the size of the average loan provided to 
borrowers has increased in almost all countries; while simultaneously, the 
numbers of borrowers introduced into the microfinance system has declined.5,6 
Given the divergence in theoretical and empirical evidence it is timely to initiate 
an innovative study focussed on the mission drift debate from a regional 
perspective. The main research question that this thesis aims to address is whether 
or not the pursuance of self-sustainability tends to drive microfinance institutions 
away from the poorest borrowers; and if so, is there evidence to support regional 
differences between Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The subject matter of mission drift from a regional perspective is 
approached by comparing the experience of MFIs where microfinance activity is 
the highest in the world; Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (Armendariz 
5 www.Ratingfund.org is an example of a rating agency. 
6The average loan balance per borrower is the most commonly used measure of mission drift; 
however, is by no means the only indicator and is subject to drawbacks. Other indicators include: 
the percent of women borrowers, household index surveys, monthly household income per capita, 
etc. 
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and Morduch, 2010). According to the Microfmance Information eXchange, the 
top ten MFIs in the world in terms of the number of clients served are all located 
in one of these two regions. However, despite this similarity, in terms of 
economic and socio-economic structure Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean are extremely diverse. In regards to estimates of poverty, nearly thirty-
one per cent of the world's poor live in South Asia while only eight per cent live 
in Latin America (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). Additively, the gross domestic 
product per capita of Latin America is nearly six times that of South Asia, which 
in turn provides a greater scope for cross-subsidization lending in Latin America 
(Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). The two regions have also developed extremely 
diverse models of microfmance. The Asian model of microfmance is driven by a 
strong sense of developmental focus with emphasis on social impacts and follows 
closely to that portrayed by the Grameen Bank (Montgomery and Weiss, 2005). 
The emphasis is on social and economic objectives (Armendariz and Szafarz, 
2009). The Asian model of microfmance is focussed mainly on poverty-
alleviation represented by the fact that the region leads the world in terms of both 
breadth and depth of outreach (Montgomery and Weiss, 2005). The Latin 
American model of microfmance is predominately a for-profit model focussed 
exclusively on pursing and obtaining financial objectives (Berger et al, 2006). 
MFIs in Latin America prefer to lend their funds to the urban economically-active 
poor, individuals with established businesses that require capital to 
grow(Montgomery and Weiss, 2005). This fact raises the issue of the forgotten 
rural poor and mission drift. For the most successful MFIs in Latin America 
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profitability is on par with the region's major international banks (Berger et al, 
2006). Some of the prominent MFIs in Latin America, like BancoSol and 
BancoComparatamos in Mexico, have issued shares and accessed funds from the 
capital market. Accessing private capital, especially foreign private capital, has 
resulted in many MFIs in Latin America changing from their philanthropic roots 
to profit-seeking commercial paradigms (Dees, 1996). One instance of similarity 
between the two regions in regards to the microfinance industry indicates that 
many MFIs in both Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean have moved away 
from following a group-lending model to that of individual lending. This raises 
the concern of whether these MFIs are seeking well-off (or mature) borrowers 
rather than seeking out themore risky ultra-poor borrowers. A second illustration 
of similarity has to do with the occurrence of microfinance bundling; although 
this is prevalent in both regions there is a higher frequency in Latin America and 
the Caribbean than in Asia. Microfinance bundling refers to the concept of 
bundling micro loans with other microfinance products, i.e. micro insurance. The 
bundling of microfinance products may have negative implications as it is 
associated with coercion and could lead to collusion among microfinance service 
providers. 
This thesisis structured as follows: Chapter II will review the economic 
and socio-economic backgrounds for sample regions Asia and Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Chapter II is divided into for sub-sections in order to independently 
review the macro-economic, socio-economic, and financial states as well as to 
review the microfinance industry and the role that it plays in providing credit to 
5 
the poor. This chapter utilizes the IMF World Economic Outlook Report 2010 and 
the Human Development Index 2010 as the basis for the macro-economic and 
socio-economic analyses. Chapter III will develop the hypotheses for this analysis 
and review the relevant literature pertaining to the sustainability of microfinance 
institutions, economies of scale, and mission drift. Chapter IV will outline the data 
and methodology used in this analysis. Chapter Vwill present the empirical results 
and Chapter VI will conclude. 
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Chapter II 
Economic and Socio-economic Analyses of 
Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
This chapter briefly reviews the macro-economic and livelihood 
conditions for sample regions Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. This 
chapter is organized into four sub-sections. Section 2.1 reviews the current macro-
economic state of the two regions based from the recovery phase of the global 
economic crisis. Section 2.2 reviews the current socio-economic conditions 
utilizing data from the Human Development Index 2010. Section 2.3 provides a 
brief summary of the financial conditions in both regions. Section 2.4 reviews the 
microfinance industry and the role that it plays in providing credit to the poor. 
2.1 Macro-economic Conditions in Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Recovery from the financial crisis fared better than what was originally 
predicted, with the economies considered as either developing or emerging 
recovering faster than the advanced economies (IMF, 2010). Among the emerging 
and developing economies, emerging Asia has been leading the recovery with 
growth also solidifying in key Latin American economies (IMF, 2010).Table 2.1 
provides macroeconomic and livelihood indicators for Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
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Table 2.1: Macro and Livelihood Indicators for Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
Countries Population GDP Density International Poverty Line Dom.Credit Provided 
(Millions) People per Population Survey by the Banking Sector 
Asia 2009 2009 Sq km Below $1.25 per day(%) Year (% of GDP) 
Korea 49 832,512 502 - 112 
Hong Kong 7 215,355 6,696 28.41 2005a 125 
Singapore 5 182,232 6,943 - - 94 
China 1,331 4,984,731 142 - - 145 
India 1,155 1,310,171 383 49.41 2004-053 73 
Indonesia 230 540,277 125 24.4' 2007a 37 
Thailand 68 263,856 132 <2 2004a 146 
Philippines 92 160,476 303 22 2006a 46 
Malaysia 27 191,601 82 <2 2004a 116 
Vietnam 87 91,854 278 24.2 2006a 95 
South Asia 1,568 1,634,623 324 - - 73 
EAP 1,944 6,345,309 122 - - 38 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Mexico 107 874,902 55 <2 2004a 46 
Brazil 4 1,571,979 23 1.6 2007° 118 
Argentina 40 308,741 15 1.0 2006bc 27 
Columbia 8 230,844 41 6.1 2006c 43 
Venezuela 28 326,498 32 18.4 2006° 20 
Peru 29 126,734 23 8.2 2007° 19 
Chile 17 163,670 23 <0.5 2006c 116 
Ecuador 4 57,249 49 3.2 2007° 20 
Bolivia 10 17,340 9 9.7 2007° 55 
Uruguay 3 36,093 19 <2 2007° 34 
Paraguay 6 15,015 16 9.3 2007c 21 
LAC 572 3,976,530 28 - - 72 
Note: a. Expenditure base. b. Covers urban area only. c. Income base. f. Weighted average of rural and urban estimates 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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2.1.1 Macro-economic Conditions in Asia 
Despite that the effect of the economic downturn on Asian economies was 
sharper than what was initially projected, the region has rebounded quickly and 
has taken the lead in the global recovery (IMF, 2010). Asia can be segregated 
categorically into five economies: advanced, newly industrialized, developing, 
ASEAN-5, and other developing Asia. Emerging Asia is a combination of the 
newly industrialized and developing economies. According to the IMF's World 
Economic Outlook there are four factors that are responsible for Asia's rapid and 
robust recovery. Foreconomies such as China and India the normalization of trade 
and the swift turnaround in inventory cycles has increased the demand for retail 
and industrial production. Secondly, the introduction of a proactive policy 
implemented a priori to the crisis in an effort to off-set the downward pull of 
exports facilitated the strong recovery. This policy allowed many Asian 
economies to create strong public and private components as well as a third factor 
- resilient domestic demand. The newly industrialized economies have capitalized 
on the rebounding inventory cycle and strong domestic and regional demand to 
facilitate a rapid recovery. The ASEAN-5 economies have also taken advantage 
of the increased regional activity, specifically those countries exporting 
electronics and commodities. Fourthly, the resumption of capital inflows also 
reinforced domestic demand and created access to external funding. The advanced 
region of Japan was able to partially capitalize on the success of the export 
industry; however, unanticipated currency appreciation of the yen, excess 
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capacity, and a weak labour market is projected to negatively affect output 
growth. 
In 2009 annual growth in real GDP in almost all of the Asian economies 
was higher than expected (IMF, 2010). The advanced economies of Asia 
underperformed relative to the other economies with annual growth in output 
reporting a 3.0 percent decline from the previous year.7 The substantial fall in 
growth was highly influenced by the dramatic deceleration of growth in Japan. On 
the contrary, in 2009 developing Asian economies outperformed other Asian 
economies with growth reporting a 6.9 percent increase from the previous year. 
The significant growth in real GDP can be attributed to the exceptionally high 
levels of growth from India and China. The robust activity from within these two 
regions is projected to facilitate growth in the rest of Asia. Projected forward into 
2010 and 2011, Asia's GDP is expected to grow by 7.9 and 6.7 percent, 
respectively. Once again, the economies considered as the advanced economies 
are expected to underperform relative to the other Asian economies. Developing 
Asia is projected to continue leading the recovery with annual growth rates over 
the two years ranging between 8.4 and 10.5 percent (Table 2.1.1). 
In 2009 Asia's inflation reached 2.0 percent and in 2010 is projected to 
see a year-over-year annual increase of 4.3 percent. In 2011 inflation is projected 
to be slightly lower at 3.3percent. In 2010 and 2011 Japan is projected to be the 
only economyin the region that will experience deflation with the change in 
consumer prices reporting a deceleration of 1.0 and 0.3 percent, respectively. 
7A11 data within this section is taken from - IMF, (2010). World Economic Outlook: Recovery. 
Risk and Rebalancing. 
10 
Affected by Japan's deflation, in 2010 and 2011, the economies of advanced Asia 
are expected to have the lowest levels of inflation relative to all other Asian 
economies. The newly industrialized economies are projected to have the second 
lowest level of inflation with changes in consumer prices reporting an increase of 
2.6 and 2.7 percent, respectively. The ASEAN-5, China, and India are expected 
to fall in between with inflation ranging between 4.6 and 6.0 percent. The 
economies considered as other developing Asia are projected to have the highest 
change in consumer prices with inflation reaching 9.1 percent in 2010 up to as 
high as 9.6 percent in 2011. 
Within Asia unemployment rates vary depending on the specific economy; 
however, within most regions have remained fairly low. Due to the unavailability 
of data for all economies an aggregate unemployment rate for all of Asia is not 
available; however, is available for certain autonomous regions. In 2009, the 
advanced economy in Asia reported an unemployment rate of 4.9 percent. The 
newly industrialized economies reported a slightly lower unemployment rate of 
4.3 percent. Countries within the ASEAN-5 recorded varying unemployment rates 
ranging as low as 1.4 percent in Thailand up to as high as 8.0 percent in 
Indonesia.In 2010 and 2011 the unemployment rate for the advanced economies is 
projected to decline to 4.7 and 4.6 percent, respectively. For the newly 
industrialized economies the unemployment rate is also expected to decline in 
2010 and 2011 to 3.8 and 3.7 percent, respectively. For the countries within the 
ASEAN-5 the varying levels of unemployment are expected to continue. 
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Table 2.1.1: Macroeconomic Indicators for Selected Asian Economies 
Real GDP Consumer Prices' Unemployment 
Projections Projections Projections 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Advanced -3.0 4.6 2.8 -0.1 0.7 1.2 4.9 4.7 4.6 
Advanced - Japan -5.2 2.8 1.5 -1.4 -1.0 -0.3 5.1 5.1 5.0 
N1E -0.9 7.8 4.5 1.3 2.6 2.7 4.3 3.8 3.7 
Korea 0.2 6.1 4.5 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.3 
Taiwan -1.9 9.3 4.4 -0.9 1.5 1.5 5.8 5.3 4.9 
Hong Kong -2.8 6.0 4.7 0.5 2.7 3.0 5.1 4.4 4.1 
Singapore -1.3 15.0 4.5 0.6 2.8 2.4 3.0 2.1 2.2 
Developing Asia 6.9 9.4 8.4 3.1 6.1 4.2 - - -
China 9.1 10.5 9.6 -0.7 3.5 2.7 4.3 4.1 4.0 
India 5.7 9.7 8.4 10.9 13.2 6.7 - - -
ASEAN-5 1.7 6.6 5.4 2.9 4.4 4.4 - - -
Indonesia 4.5 6.0 6.2 4.8 5.1 5.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 
Thailand -2.2 7.5 4.0 -0.8 3.0 2.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Philippines 1.1 7.0 4.5 3.2 4.5 4.0 7.5 7.2 7.2 
Malaysia -1.7 6.7 5.3 0.6 2.2 2.1 3.7 3.5 3.2 
Vietnam 5.3 6.5 6.8 6.7 8.4 8.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 
Other 
Developing 4.4 5.3 4.6 11.2 9.1 9.6 - - -
Emerging Asia 5.8 9.2 7.9 2.8 5.6 4.0 - - -
Asia 3.6 7.9 6.7 2.0 4.3 3.3 - - -
Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. 
Source: IMF. (2010). World Economic Outlook: Recovery. Risk and Rebalancing. 
Other Developing Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Lao, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Vanuatu. 
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2.1.2 Macro-economic Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has also been recovering from 
the downturn quicker and more robust than originally anticipated (IMF, 2010). 
The region is categorized into three economies: South America, Central America, 
and the Caribbean (IMF, 2010). According to the IMF World Economic Outlook, 
Latin America and the Caribbean's robust recovery can be attributed to various 
factors: solid macroeconomic policy, policy support, external financing 
conditions, robust commodity export revenues, and sustained domestic demand. 
All of these components played a significant role in driving the recovery of the 
LA-4 (Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Peru). Mexico is also staging a steady 
recovery; however, the economy's tight financial links to the United States pose it 
at risk for uncertainty. The potential uncertainty of the U.S. economy also affects 
Central America and the Caribbean as they have become partially relianton the 
income from American tourists as well as U.S. remittance flows. As with Asia, 
the recovery rates within LAC are diverse and dependent upon the strength of 
macroeconomic policy, resilience of domestic demand, and the degree of 
exposure to global trade and financial conditions. For those commodity exporting 
economies output will continue to grow as a result of trading links with China and 
other intraregional linkages. 
In 2009 growth in real GDP for Latin America and the Caribbean declined 
1.7 percent from the previous year.8 Central America and South America 
underperformed compared to the Caribbean with declines in output of 0.5 and 0.2 
8A11 data within this section is taken from - IMF, (2010). World Economic Outlook: Recovery. 
Risk and Rebalancing. 
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percent, respectively. Within the LA-4, Chile and Brazil underperformed 
compared to Columbia and Peru. Growth rate projections for 2010 and 2011 are 
expected to be significantly higher. In 2010, South America is projected to 
experience a 6.3 percent increase in output. The substantial increase is due to high 
projected outputs for Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Overall, in 
2010 and 2011 Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to experience an 
increase in output of 5.7 and 4.0 percent, respectively (Table 2.1.2). 
In 2009 inflation for the region was reported at 6.0 percent. This value was 
highly influenced by Venezuela's incredible 27.1 percent inflation rate. Central 
America and the Caribbean reported substantially lower rates of inflation than the 
other economies with 3.8 and 3.5 percent, respectively. With the exception of the 
Caribbean, projections for 2010 and 2011 remain fairly consistent for all 
economies. 
Unemployment within the region was fairly high in 2009 compared to 
Asia. Unfortunately, the aggregate unemployment rate for all economies within 
Latin America and the Caribbean is unavailable due the inconsistency of data; 
however, unemployment rates for many regions individually are provided. For the 
LAC economies for which data is available, the majority of unemployment rates 
in 2009 ranged between 7.3 percent and 9.6 percent. With the exception of 
Columbia and Paraguay, unemployment rates within South America were fairly 
similar for all regions. Aggregate figures for the Caribbean are not available; 
however, it is expected that due to a high reliance on the agricultural sector 
unemployment rates will remain an on-going challenge. 
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Table 2.1.2: Macroeconomic Indicators for Western Hemisphere Economies 
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Unemployment 
Projections Projections Projections 
2009 2010 2011 201 39 201C 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Mexico -6.5 5.0 3.9 5.3 4.2 3.2 5.5 5.0 4.5 
South America -0.2 6.3 4.1 6.4 6.8 6.9 - - -
Brazil -0.2 7.5 4.1 4.9 5.0 4.6 8.1 7.2 7.5 
Argentina 0.9 7.5 4.0 6.3 10.6 10.6 8.4 8.0 8.6 
Columbia 0.8 4.7 4.6 4.2 2.4 2.6 12.0 12.0 11.5 
Venezuela -3.3 -1.3 0.5 27.1 29.2 32.2 7.9 8.6 8.1 
Peru 0.9 8.3 6.0 2.9 1.7 2.5 8.6 8.0 7.5 
Chile -1.5 5.0 6.0 1.7 1.7 3.0 9.6 9.0 8.7 
Ecuador 0.4 2.9 2.3 5.2 4.0 3.5 8.5 8.6 8.5 
Bolivia 3.4 4.0 4.5 3.3 1.7 4.1 - - -
Uruguay 2.9 8.5 5.0 7.1 6.5 6.4 7.3 7.0 6.9 
Paraguay -3.8 9.0 5.0 2.6 4.6 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.2 
Central America -0.5 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 - - -
The Caribbean 0.4 2.4 4.3 3.5 7.2 5.5 - - -
LAC -1.7 5.7 4.0 6.0 6.1 5.8 - - -
Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. 
Source: IMF. (2010). World Economic Outlook: Recovery. Risk and Rebalancing. 
Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama. 
The Caribbean: Antigua, Barbuda, The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts, 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenadine, Suriname, Trinidad, Tobago. 
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2.2 Socio-economic Conditions in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
Poverty is measured using the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), 
developed in 2010 by Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative and the 
United Nations Development Programme.9 The index complements the monetary 
based measure of less than US$1,25/day by considering multiple deprivations and 
their overlap.10 The MPI follows the same dimensions as the Human 
Development Index. Health, education, and income and are measured using 10 
indicators: assets, floor, electricity, toilet, water, cooking fuel, children enrolled, 
number of years of schooling, child mortality, and nutrition." The MPI is 
calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty by the average intensity of 
poverty.12 
2.2.1 Socio-economic Conditions in Asia 
In Asia, an average of 33.8 percent of the population is considered to be 
MPI poor (they are deprived in at least 30.0 percent of the weighted indicators, by 
definition). Those 33.8 percent considered as MPI poor suffer from deprivation in 
50.2 percent of the indicators used for this measure. That is to say that those 
individuals classified as MPI poor suffer from deprivation in an average of five 
out of the ten indicators listed above. Other developing Asia is the poorest 
'Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI): An index of acute multidimensional poverty. MPI has 3 
dimensions: health, education, and standard of living which are measured using 10 indicators. The 
MPI is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty by the average intensity of MPI poverty 
across the poor. Incidence of poverty: the proportion of people who are poor according to the MPI 
(those who are deprived in at least 30% of the weight indicators). 
Intensity of deprivation: percentage of weighted indicators in which an average poor household is 
deprived. 
1 
""Multidimensional Poverty Index" Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. 
Retrieved 03/01/2011. 
" Ibid 
12 Ibid 
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economy in the region with an average 48.1 percent of the population considered 
MPI poor. Those 48.1 percent suffer from deprivation in 52.0 percent of 
indicators. At 12.3 percent, the ASEAN-5 has the lowest average headcount of 
those considered MPI poor; however, those 12.3 percent suffer from deprivation 
in 47.6 percent of indicators. Developing Asia ranks in between with 34.0 percent 
of the population considered to be MPI poor. Those 34.0 percent suffer from 
deprivation in 49.2 percent of indicators.13 Given that the economy of other 
developing Asia has the highest headcount of MPI poor it is appropriate that they 
are deprived in the largest percentage of indicators. This is due to a correlation 
between headcount and average intensity in which countries with higher MPI 
headcounts tend to have higher average intensity (Alkire and Santos, 2010). 
2.2.2 Socio-economic Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
In regards to MPI poverty and intensity of deprivation, Latin America and 
the Caribbean isconsidered far better-off than Asia. Since other developing Asia 
has a higher MPI headcount than any of the LAC economies it is expected that 
none of the LAC economies will have a higher intensity of deprivation. InLatin 
America and the Caribbean, on average, 16.6 percent of the population is MPI 
poor (they are deprived in at least 30.0 percent of the weighted indicators, by 
definition). Those who are MPI poor suffer from deprivation in 44.8 percent of 
indicators. The North American economy has the lowest MPI headcount at 4.0 
percent;however, those 4.0 percent suffer from deprivation in 38.9 percent of the 
indicators. Central America has the largest MPI headcount at 33.1 percent of the 
13 Advanced and newly industrialised Asia did not report MPI values. 
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population. Those considered MPI poor in this economy suffer from deprivation 
in 50.0 percent of the indicators. 
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2.3 Financial Sector in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean: 
2.3.1 Financial Sector in Asia 
The financial system in developing Asia continues to remain 
underdeveloped compared with that of the industrial economies (Asian 
Development Bank, 2010). Since the Asian crisis in 1997 developing Asia has 
been making significant strides to establish a sounder and more efficient financial 
system through the efforts of extensive post-crisis reform and restructuring (Asian 
Development Bank, 2010). Asia's commercial banks have responded remarkably 
well to the post-crisis reform. They have not only improved and expanded their 
existing financial products and services but have undertaken new business 
ventures, including: investment banking, consumer lending, and real estate. 
However, recent research from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) signifies that 
the financial sector is becoming less dependent on banks as the system develops 
and diversifies. The Asian Development Bank analyzed the regions financial 
depth (the size of the financial system relative to GDP) as a proxy for financial 
system development (Asian Development Bank, 2010). The results indicated that 
Asia's aggregate financial depth had increased since the 1990's, signifying that 
the financial system has been developing. Concurrently, the growing importance 
of equity markets further signifies that the region appears to be heading towards a 
predominately market-based system (Asian Development Bank, 2010). However, 
despite the increased diversification in system structure access to the financial 
services within the region lags far behind that of high income OECD countries 
(Asian Development Bank, 2010). According to a recent study, approximately 
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59.0 and 58.0 percent of the total population for East Asia and South Asia, 
respectively, are financially un-served (Chala et al, 2009). See Appendix 1 for the 
percentage of households with access to a bank account for selected Asian 
countries. 
2.3.2 Financial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The financial sector in Latin America and the Caribbean has undergone 
tremendous trials and tribulations since the early 1990's. From one debt crisis to 
the next the regions limited access to bank credit and lingering financial system 
uncertainties have impacted the regions constrained economic growth (Belaisch et 
al, 2005). Financial liberalization and the promise of reforms spurred credit 
growth in the early 1990's; however, due to an onslaught of activities banking 
crises erupted throughout the region and banking quickly deteriorated (Stallings 
and Studart, 2002; Belaisch et al, 2005). In an attempt to rectify the severely 
damaged financial system banks were restructured and/or recapitalized; however, 
this was successful in only some Latin American countries but not all. For those 
countries where it was successful the restructuring strengthened the financial 
system and decreased the chance a recurring crisis (Belaisch et al, 2005). 
Unfortunately, simultaneously, the restructuring allowed for an overhaul of the 
banks regulatory systems (Belaisch et al, 2005). This coupled with the relaxation 
and/or elimination of foreign bank regulatory limitations led to foreign banks 
gaining an increased market share within the system (Belaisch et al, 2005). By the 
year 2000 in Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, and Venezuela foreign 
banks owned more than one half of the banking system (Belaisch et al, 2005). As 
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of recently, a second wave of financial crises hit Latin America. The countries hit 
included Ecuador (1999), Argentina (2001), Uruguay (2002), the Dominican 
Republic (2001) and Bolivia in (2003). 
Today, Latin America and the Caribbean is primarily a bank-based 
financial system with minute and illiquid security markets (Stallings and Studart, 
2002). In times of uncertainties banks have retained a comparative advantage in 
obtaining information that is crucial to financial intermediation (Belaisch et al, 
2005). World Bank literature analyzed the market classification by evaluating the 
regions structure-size (stock market capitalization to GDP/bank credit to GDP) 
and structure-activity (stock market value traded to GDP/bank credit to GDP) to 
verify the predominance of a bank-based financial system.14 Given that both 
values for Latin America and the Caribbean declined confirms that the region 
continues to operate mainly as a bank-based system (Beck and Demirgiic-Kunt, 
2009). In most Latin American countries the private sector's use of bond and 
equity markets to raise financial resources remains limited relative to its resource 
to banks (Belaisch et al, 2005). In regards to financial depth (the size of the 
financial system relative to GDP), Latin America is much smaller than Asia and 
consequently considered to be less developed (Cuadroe/ al, 2002). Deposit to 
GDP ratios are less than 50.0 percent compared with the typical ratio of 90.0 
percent in the emerging markets of East Asia (Belaisch et al, 2005). Given that 
financial depth is correlated with financial efficiency it is highly likely that Latin 
America's financial system is also less efficient (Bossone and Lee, 2002). Latin 
America has a larger proportion of unbanked individuals than Asia; 65.0 percent 
14 A higher value for both indicators specifies a more likely market-based financial system 
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of the total population in Latin America is un-served bythe formal financial 
system (Chala et al, 2009). See Appendix 1 for the percentage of households with 
access to a bank account for selected Latin American and the Caribbean countries. 
22 
2.4 Microfinance in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
The microfinance industries in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
were created out of extremely diverse ideological, political, and economic 
conditions. As a result, the microfinance industries that currently exist within the 
two regions today portray very distinct differences. The microfinance industry in 
Asia was born in Bangladesh in the early 1970's when Professor Muhammad 
Yunus undertook a research project that involved providing small amounts of 
credit to the poor. This endeavour was purely socially driven and has since 
embedded the roots for which the microfinance industry in Asia stems from 
today. On the contrary, microfinance in Latin America and the Caribbean 
developed under significantly dissimilar conditions. In Bolivia, when a collapsing 
populist regime threatened to unleash widespread unemployment Banco Sol, a 
microfinance institution, stepped-in to provide credit to the cash constrained 
informal sector. Not so long after, the region was introduced to the potential of 
commercial profitability. As a result, the regions lending methodologies are less 
concerned with the rural poor and targeting poverty and are more so focussed on 
the economically active poor and supporting microenterprise endeavours. 
2.4.1 Microfinance in Asia 
Today Asia's microfinance institutions continue to remain socially 
engaged and lead the world in terms of both breadth (number of borrowers) and 
depth (relative poverty of borrowers) of outreach. In 2009 the microfinance 
industries in South and East Asia reached 50.0 million and 13.9 million 
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borrowers, respectively.15 The size of the loan balance provided to borrowers in 
Asia is lower than the rest of the world, likely indicating a more dedicated focus 
on low-income clients (Microfinance Information eXchange, 2010). In 2009, the 
median size of the average loan balance provided to borrowers from MFIs in 
South and East Asia equated to SUS141 and SUS331, respectively. Outreach to 
women is higher in Asia than the rest of the world with the average institution at 
94.4 percent. The vast majority of credit products are used to support 
microenterprise activities, with small shares going towards consumer lending, 
education, and mortgage or housing loans (Microfinance Information eXchange, 
2010). 
In 2009 the region accrued $US4 billion in deposits from 38.0 million 
depositors. These deposits were used as a significant source of financing for 
Asian MFIs. Typically MFIs have three types of financing available: deposits, 
borrowings, and equity (Microfinance Information eXchange, 2010). Historically, 
equity has been the main source of funding for the region, providing over 60.0 
percent in 2003. Over the past few years growth in equity has been surpassed by 
both growth in deposits and growth in borrowings. By 2008 equity provided only 
30.0 percent of the funding to the region with deposits and borrowings comprising 
two-thirds of total financing (Microfinance Information eXchange, 2010). 
The cost of providing loans to borrowers in Asia is significantly less than 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2009 the median cost per borrower for 
MFIs in South and East Asia equated to $US18 and $US65, respectively. The 
15 All data in this section is taken from the Microfinance Information eXchange. Retrieved 
September 1, 2011.From http://www.mixmarket.org/. 
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densely populated low income areas in Asia allow for loan officers to provide and 
monitor loans at relatively lower costs. In 2009 the portfolio at risk over 30 and 
90 days remained relatively stable for MFIs in South Asia; however, for MFIs in 
East Asia and the Pacific the median value for both indicators increased 
slightly.In 2009 MFIs in South Asia experienced an increase in return on equity 
from the previous year; however, for MFIs in East Asia and the Pacific return on 
equity declined. 
2.4.2 Microfinance in Latin America and the Caribbean 
In 2009 the cumulative credit portfolio for microfinance institutions in 
Latin American and the Caribbean reached approximately SUS20 billion.16 The 
cumulative number of active borrowers reached 14.3 million, a growth rate of 9.0 
percent over the previous year. Although the MFIs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean reached substantially fewer borrowers than MFIs in Asia; the median 
value for the size of the loan balance per borrower was significantly higher. In 
2009 the median value for the size of the loan balance per borrower equated to 
$US917. The regions contribution of women borrowers is significantly fewer than 
Asia, with the median institutions at 62.0 percent. The number of depositors 
reached a cumulative total of $US17 million, a growth rate of 27.0 percent. In 
2009 deposits were the main sources of funding comprising 52.3 percent of the 
total funding to the region (Microfinance Information eXchange, 2010). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean the two major credit portfolio types 
are microenterprise and consumption, with microenterprise being the more 
I6A11 data in this section is taken from the Microfinance Information eXchange. Retrieve 
September 1, 2011. From http://www.mixmarket.org/. 
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favourable portfolio of the two (Microfinance Information eXchange, 2010). In 
2009 the number of microenterprise loans increased to over 8,000 while the loan 
portfolio microenterprise loans increased to just under SUSIO.O million. In 2009 
consumption credit saw a solid increase in growth in both the number of loans 
disbursed and the loan portfolio. Consumption credits grew at 21.2 percent, to just 
over $US4 million, while the number of loans rose by 9.3 percent, to just over 
5,000. Housing credit also experienced a substantial increase in growth; however, 
the size of the portfolio and number of active loans remains far below 
microenterprise and consumption at this time (Microfinance Information 
eXchange, 2010). 
Despite the increase in the number of loans and size of the credit 
portfolios the quality of the loans has been decreasing. In 2009 the portfolio at 
risk over 30 days increased to a median value of 6.0 percent while portfolio at risk 
over 90 days increased to a median value of 4.0 percent. In 2009 return on equity 
declined significantly, down from a median value of 9.0 percent in 2008 to that of 
6.0 percent in 2009. Prior to the global economic crisis the downturn in 
profitability was attributed to an increase in industry competition; however,post-
crisis the hurdles in microfinance have been accredited to the slowdown in 
economic activity (Microfinance Information eXchange, 2010). 
As mentioned above, the cost of providing loans in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is substantially higher than in Asia. In 2009 the median value for the 
cost per borrower equated to SUS175. The higher cost per borrower can be 
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attributed to the lower percentage and sparse location of poor individuals residing 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
For Latin America and the Caribbean MFIs social management is 
becoming an increasingly recognized area of assessment and monitoring; 
however, only 27.0 percent of MFIs currently have a standing social performance 
committee that regularly reviews social performance concerns (Microfinance 
Information eXchange, 2010). Despite the challenges, the region has made 
considerable progress towards integrating the social component into their 
operations. 
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Table 2.4.1: Microfinance Growth Indicators for Asia 
South Asia 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of Borrowers 13,512,280 17,882,185 24,383,439 29,956,551 36,388,113 42,405,238 50,022,228 
Number of Depositors 13,403,380 15,941,327 19,136,200 26,434,335 30,165,506 32,018,765 33,109,727 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
($) 782,096 817,537 1,322,993 1,944,613 3,738,409 3,957,776 4,391,870 
Assets ($) 1,178,303 1,083,073 1,793,442 3,429,815 5,195,352 5,801,421 6,314,966 
Portfolio at Risk > 30 
Days 2.7% 1.9% 1.2% 1.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 
Portfolio at Risk > 90 
Days 1.6% 1.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3% 
ROE 4.9% 10.8% 12.8% 14.0% 10.5% 8.6% 10.5% 
Loan 
Balance/Borrower ($) 72 76 92 107 137 123 141 
Cost/Borrower ($) 11 12 11 12 16 18 18 
East Asia and the Paci 1c 
Number of Borrowers 4,493,322 5,408,477 9,468,511 10,725,120 8,783,244 15,448,626 13,897,499 
Number of Depositors 1,304,673 1,542,817 2,097,382 6,593,152 3,255,613 4,614,980 4,899,512 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
($) 965,457 1,124,755 1,325,122 1,520,924 1,767,031 1,953,239 3,789,136 
Assets ($) 1,464,558 1,598,702 1,840,395 2,181,396 2,535,085 2,924,964 5,256,007 
Portfolio at Risk >30 
Days 5.1% 3.8% 4.3% 5.0% 3.5% 1.7% 4.1% 
Portfolio at Risk > 90 
Days 1.9% 2.2% 2.7% 3.2% 2.4% 1.1% 2.7% 
ROE 10.1% 15.6% 11.8% 14.2% 13.8% 14.0% 11.2% 
Loan 
Balance/Borrower ($) 200 156 204 245 288 319 331 
Cost/Borrower ($) 43 36 42 51 58 66 65 
Source: MIX Market Database 
Note: Number of Borrowers, Number of Depositors is a sum value; Gross Loan Portfolio, Assets, Loan Balance/Borrower, Cost/Borrower ROE, Portfolio at 
Risk at both 30 and 90 days is a median value 
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Table 2.4.2: Microfinance Growth Indicators for Latin America and the Caribbean 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of Borrowers 3,464,294 4,742,094 7,805,509 9,440,623 12,053,183 13,064,519 14,278,727 
Number of Depositors 943,675 3,210,057 6,350,983 7,640,896 9,710,388 13,564,741 17,168,351 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
($) 2,866,309 3,290,834 3,325,504 4,076,073 4,730,981 4,741,481 6,165,183 
Assets ($) 3,786,335 4,075,007 4,254,230 4,957,230 6,188,646 6,391,176 7,810,931 
Portfolio at Risk >30 
Days 4.7% 5.8% 4.5% 4.1% 3.8% 4.9% 5.7% 
Portfolio at Risk > 90 
Days 3.2% 3.4% 2.6% 2.6% 2.1% 3.0% 3.7% 
ROE 12.6% 12.6% 10.7% 11.5% 10.3% 8.8% 6.3% 
Loan 
Balance/Borrower ($) 514 609 641 659 746 828 917 
Cost/Borrower ($) 124 120 144 146 146 177 176 
Source: MIX Market Database 
Note: Number of Borrowers, Number of Depositors is a sum value; Gross Loan Portfolio, Assets, Loan Balance/Borrower, Cost/Borrower ROE, Portfolio at 
Risk at both 30 and 90 days is a median value 
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Chapter III 
Review of Literature 
This section will provide a review of the existing literature and provides 
the various hypotheses to be tested in the empirical investigation. This thesis 
utilizes three empirical estimations: (1) do MFIs attain economies of scale as they 
increase their outreach;(2) what are the determinants of operational self-
sufficiency of MFIs - interest rates, repeated loans to seasoned borrowers or cost; 
and (3) doespursing self-sustainability tend to drive microfinance institutions 
away from the poorest borrowers; and if so, is there evidence to support regional 
differences between Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Empirical 
estimations (1) and (2) provide support and additional information in order to 
more accurately answer the main research question, (3). 
3.1 Economies of Scale 
Existing literature has indicated that attaining economies of scale through 
increasing the average loan size provided to borrowers leads to a MFIs ability to 
attain cost-efficiencies and thus increases the likelihood of attaining self-
sufficiency. The work of Brau and Woller (2004) concludes that MFIs are able to 
attain cost-efficiencies by capturing economies of scale by extending larger loans 
to mature clients. Navajase? al (2000) suggest that in an attempt to attain 
commercial funding MFIs will seek to capture economies of scale by extending 
larger loans to wealthier target markets. The work of Crombrugghe, Tenikue and 
Sureda (2008) find from their study an opposite result. They conclude that the 
elasticity of the operating cost per borrower to the size of the average loan 
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provided to borrowers is positive as a result of higher selection and monitoring 
costs associated with lending larger loans. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hi: MFIs that increase the size of the average loan provided to borrowers 
will experience cost increases as a result of higher selection and monitoring costs 
associated with lending larger loans. 
The final hypothesis in the analysis of economies of scale indicates that 
there exists a relationship between increasing the scale of an institution and lower 
average costs.17 Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda (2008) utilize the number of 
borrowers to represent the scale (outreach) of MFIs. The results conclude that the 
operating cost per borrower is sensitive to the number of borrowers. Therefore, 
increasing the number of borrowers would lower the average operating costs and 
would raise total operating costs less than proportionately with the number of 
borrowers. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: MFIs that increase the scale of their institutions in the current state of 
affairs will decrease the average cost per borrower; therefore, capturing 
economies of scale. 
3.2 Operational Self-Sustainability 
Existing literature has indicated the presence of a positive relationship 
between higher interest rates and increased self-sufficiency. Brau and Woller 
(2004) indicate that as a result of large overhead costs associated with providing 
microloans, compared with that of formal financial institutions, MFIs are required 
to charge relatively higher interest rates in order to achieve self-sufficiency. 
Augsburg and Fouillet (2010) suggest that in order for MFIs to achieve 
independence from subsidies and donor support cost-covering interest rates are a 
necessity. Christen et al (1995) studied the performance of 11 leading 
l7This thesis uses total assets as a proxy to represent the outreach of a microfinance institution. 
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microfinance institutions and found that the most financially viable programs 
differed from their peers in their willingness to set interest rates that would allow 
for the full recovery of costs. Cull, Demirgiic-Kunt and Murduch (2007) test this 
hypothesis by analyzing if higher interest rates lead to agency problems and 
subsequently to less profitability. Their results conclude that individual lending, 
as opposed to group lending, tend to be more profitable when average interest 
rates are higher. However, when MFIs charge interest rates that are too high it 
could lead to lower profitability. Cull et al (2007) suggest further that when MFIs 
charge interest rates that are above a certain threshold rate only the low-quality 
high risk clients will borrower. The work of Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda 
(2008) find similar results. Their results suggest that raising interest rates can be 
done without harming profitability; however, charging interest rates that are too 
high could lead to concerns of moral hazard and charging interest rates that are 
too low could lead to excess demand. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: MFIs charging higher interest rates will have a higher level of 
operational self-sufficiency; however, there exists a threshold rate that once 
surpassed increasing rates any farther could influence self-sufficiency negatively. 
Next in the analysis of sustainability, empirical research has indicated that 
there exists a relationship between increasing the number of borrowers for a given 
number of field officers and attaining a higher level of self-sufficiency. The work 
of Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda (2008) test this hypothesis in their study 
and conclude that increasing the ratio of the number of borrowers per field officer 
does contribute to increased profitability. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: MFIs with a higher ratio of the number of borrowers per loan officer 
tend to have higher self-sufficiency. 
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Subsequently, empirical research has also indicated that there exists a 
relationship between higher average loan balances per borrower and increased 
self-sustainability. The work of Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda (2008) test 
this hypothesis and conclude that increasing the size of the average loan offered to 
borrowers is a benefit; however, to attain maximum sustainability MFIs should 
lend neither very small nor very large amounts. The work of Brau and Woller 
(2004) conclude that those MFIs proving self-sufficient do so by extending larger 
loans to marginally poor clients. Navajase? al (2000) suggested that most MFIs 
demonstrating self-sufficiency have tended to loan to borrowers who were either 
slightly above or slightly below the poverty line. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hs: MFIs with larger average loan sizes provided to borrowers will attain 
higher levels of self-sufficiency. 
The last hypothesis in the analysis of sustainability indicates that there 
exists a relationship between lower average costs and increased self-sustainability. 
The work of Paxton et al (2002) observes not only the effect of costs on 
sustainability but of costs on outreach as well. Their results suggest that due to 
high transaction costs associated with providing smaller loans there exists a trade­
off between serving the poorest segments and attaining financial viability. The 
work of Ylinen (2010) indicates that in order to increase sustainability MFIs need 
to work towards reducing operational expenses. As mentioned above, the work of 
Brau and Woller (2004) conclude that MFIs that are able to attain cost-
efficiencies through economies of scale will prove self-sustainable. This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
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H6: MFIs with lower costs associated with providing loans to borrowers 
will attain higher levels of self-sufficiency. 
3.3 Mission Drift 
Existing literature has indicated the existence of a relationship between the 
size of the average loan balance provided to borrowers and higher levels of 
profitability (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). The work of Mersland and Strom (2010) 
test the hypothesis and confirm that average loan size increases with profit per 
client; therefore, MFIs are able to earn larger absolute profits with large loan 
sizes. The work of Ylinen (2010) further confirms this hypothesis by concluding 
that MFIs with higher levels of profitability tend to have higher average loan 
balances, indicating that MFIs face a trade-off and are therefore susceptible to 
mission drift. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H7: MFIs with higher average loan balances tend to provide more loans to 
well-off borrowers as compared with ultra-poor borrowers and hence are 
susceptible to mission drift. 
Subsequently in the analysis of mission drift, Cull et al (2007) find a 
positive coefficient for institution size and average loan size, indicating that large 
individual based lenders perform relatively poor in terms of outreach. Ylinen 
(2010) suggests that older and more mature MFIs trying to increase access to 
commercial funding may become susceptible to disbursing larger average loans 
than younger MFIs. Similarly, Ylinen (2010) suggests that given the size of an 
institution is representative of its age, larger MFIs are more susceptible to mission 
drift. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H8. Mission drift is suspect to occur as institutions mature; therefore, 
larger and older institutions are suspect to demonstrate higher average loan 
sizes. 
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Lastly in the analysis of mission drift, existing literature has suggested that 
average loan size increases with average cost. Mersland and Strom (2010) 
confirm this hypothesis and suggest that the positive relationship indicates that 
inefficient MFIs find it necessary to shift their loan portfolios toward larger 
average loans; therefore, inefficient MFIs are more susceptible to mission drift. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H9: 1If the average loan balance per borrower is influenced by the average 
cost per borrower more so than operational self-sufficiency, cost efficient MFIs 
should not fall suspect to mission drift. 
3.4 Mission Drift in Asia vs. Latin America and the Caribbean 
Given that South Asia continues to have one of the largest markets of poor 
individuals in the world, this region will continue to have the ability to attract massive 
numbers of poor unbanked individuals into the microfmance industry every year. As a 
result,for MFIs in Asia mission drift is hard to prove industry-wide. On the contrary, 
given the lower percentage and sparse location of poor individuals in Latin America and 
the Caribbean mission drift is more likely occur. Due to an underdeveloped financial 
system MFIs in Latin America have become attractive sources of funding for unbanked 
wealthier clients in the regions. As a result, MFIs in this region are susceptible to cross-
subsidization lending and show vulnerability of mission drift (Armendariz and Szafarz, 
2009; Kar, 2010). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hio: The results for mission drift in Latin America and the Caribbean will 
be more consistent than what is found in Asia. 
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Chapter IV 
Database and Methodology 
4.1 Database 
The data for the empirical investigation is based on the Microfinance 
Information eXchange (i.e, MIX Market) a not-for-profit private organization. 
MIX Market is one of the largest sources of financial and social performance data 
on MFIs globally. This empirical research analyzes financial performance and 
outreach data, collected from the MIX Market database, for 419 microfinance 
institutions between the periods of 2005-2009. The institutions were selected 
based on the completeness of reporting for the required time-period of study and 
are therefore not representative of all microfinance institutions operating within 
the two regions. These institutions do, however, collectively account for 57 
percent of the MFIs in the two regions combined. 
The data are used to form two independent panels, 1) Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and 2) Asia.18Due to the variability in the completeness of data the 
sample size between the two regions differ. The sample for Latin America and 
Caribbean consists of 223MFI's over 5 time periods for a total of 1,115 
observations. Table 4.1.1 shows the variance in the number of microfinance 
institutions within the sample for Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
cumulative percentage for the regions of Ecuador and Peru equal 35 percent of the 
MFIs in the sample. It is necessary to keep in mind this variance when analysing 
the results. 
18 Asia consists of South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific 
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The panel for Asia consists of 196 MFIs over 5 time periods for a total of 
980 observations. Table 4.1.2 shows the variance in the number of microfinance 
institutions within the sample for Asia. Regions where microfinance is more 
developed; including Bangladesh, the Philippines, and India represent a 
substantial proportion of the sample. These three areas combined account for 56 
percent of the MFIs within the sample. It is important to make note that these 
institutions will be over represented in the analysis compared to the others. 
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Table 4.1.1: Distribution of Microfinance Institutions in Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
Region Number of MFIs 
Argentina 5 
Bolivia 17 
Brazil 6 
Chile 3 
Colombia 13 
Costa Rica 8 
Dominican Republic 3 
Ecuador 34 
El Salvador 11 
Guatemala 12 
Haiti 6 
Honduras 12 
Mexico 21 
Nicaragua 19 
Panama 3 
Paraguay 5 
Peru 44 
Venezuela 1 
Source: MIX Market Database 
Table 4.1.2: Distribution of Microfinance Institutions in Asia 
Region Number of MFIs 
Afghanistan 13 
Bangladesh 23 
Cambodia 13 
China 4 
East Timor 1 
India 40 
Indonesia 13 
Nepal 15 
Pakistan 11 
Papua New Guinea 1 
Philippines 47 
Samoa 1 
Sri Lanka 7 
Thailand 1 
Vietnam 6 
Source: MIX Market Database 
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4.2 Regression Approach 
This study adopts a panel estimation framework. The equations mentioned 
in chapter three are estimated by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed 
effects, and random effects. The initial estimation procedure employed is pooled 
OLS. This form of estimation is the simplest estimator for panel data and is in 
most cases unlikely to be sufficient. Despite the expected inadequacy estimating 
pooled OLS provides a baseline for comparisons with more complex models 
(Cottrell, 2005). Pooled OLS assumes a constant intercept and slope regardless of 
the cross-section type (Park, 2009). The pooled OLS specification is written in the 
following form: 
Y« = Xifi+uit 
Where _yi(is the observation of the dependent variable for MFI i in period t, 
Xitis a 1 x k vector of the independent variables observed for MFI i in period t, 
is a A: x 1 vector of parameters, and w„is an error term specific to MFI i in period t 
(Cottrell, 2005). The error term in pooled OLS must be orthogonal with the 
independent variables and be independent from one another. As a result of the 
same cross-section being observed over time this typically does not hold in panel 
data causing error terms of specific units to be correlated with each other 
(Cottrell, 2005). 
The next two models employed are the random and fixed effects models. 
The random effects model can be written as uit =o, + elh yielding 
Yn = Xitfi + Vi + €n 
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That is, Vi, is treated as a random drawing from a given probability 
distribution (Cottrell, 2005). It therefore imposes a dummy variable inclusive of 
an intercept that represents a common mean value for all groups, plus a group 
specific error-term that will capture group deviations from that common mean. 
The random effects model assumes that they entity error term is not correlated 
with the independent variables. 
The standard entity-fixed effects model is a special case of the random 
effects model and is used to control for unobservable heterogeneity when this 
heterogeneity is constant over time. The model can be written as uit = at + eih 
yielding 
Yu = Xj$ + at + e„ 
That is, Uit,is decomposed into a unit-specific and time-invariant 
component, a,-, and an observation-specific error, 6jt The a, are then treated as 
fixed parameters (in effects, unit-specific ^-intercepts), which are to be estimated. 
This is done by subtracting the group mean from each of the variables and 
estimating the model without a constant (Cottrell, 2005). The fixed effects model 
assumes that the entity error terms are correlated with the independent variables. 
This thesis goes further to estimate the time-fixed effects model if this 
model yields a higher level of significance of the coefficients. This model differs 
from the standard entity-fixed effects model by assuming that the average value of 
7/,changes over time but not cross-sectionally. In this model a, is a time-varying 
intercept that captures all of the variables that affect 7„and that vary over time but 
are constant cross-sectionally (Brooks, 2008). The two models, entity-fixed 
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effects and time-fixed effects can be combined and estimated controlling for 
unobservable heterogeneity when this heterogeneity is constant over time as well 
as controlling for unobservable heterogeneity when this heterogeneity is constant 
cross-sectionally. In order to test the model of best-fit a series of tests are 
conducted. Firstly, to validate the preference for using the fixed effects model 
over pooled OLS the redundant fixed effects test is employed to test the null 
hypothesis that the cross-sectional units have a common intercept. A significant p-
value for both regions (Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia) and all 
estimations (sustainability, mission drift, and economies of scale) counted against 
the null hypothesis and therefore it was rejected. This confirms that there is a 
validation to the preference of using the fixed effect approach over pooled OLS. 
Once it is determined that panel methodology is the structure of best-fit, the 
Hausman test is employed in order to validate the preference of using the random 
effect approach against the fixed effect approach. The Hausman test probes 
whether the entity error terms are correlated with the independent variables. The 
null hypothesis is that they are not. A significant p-value of less than 0.05counted 
against the null hypothesis that the random effect approach is consistent and 
efficient, in favour of the fixed effect approach (Cottrell, 2005). Choosing 
between the entity effects, time effects, or a combination of the two is also based 
on the redundant fixed effects test and Hausman test. If there was a situation in 
which more than one model could be the model of best fit the level of 
significance, the R2, and adjusted R2 are employed to make the final decision. 
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After the appropriate tests were conducted it was deemed the model of best-fit to 
be the entity-fixed effects model. 
Given that panel data typically suffers from heteroskedasticity, meaning 
the error terms' variance is not constant over observations, the White period 
method for calculating robust standard errors is used. This method assumes that 
the errors of a cross-section are heteroskedastic and serially correlated. 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
The hypotheses stated in chapter III were used to formulate the regression 
questions estimated in this thesis. Hypotheses one and two are used to form the 
following equation for economies of scale: 
Log(Cost per Borroweruj = o;•+ (3iLog(A verage Loan Balance per 
Borrowerit) + j32Log(Total Assetsit) + elt 
0 ; & < 0  
Hypotheses three, four, five, and six are used to form the following 
equation for operational self-sufficiency: 
OSSu = oti+ (31(Yielda) + fafYield2it) + faLog(Borrowers per Loan 
Officerit) +j34Log(A verage Loan Balance per Borrowerit) + 
ftLog(Cost per Borrower,J+ e„ 
/3/> 0 ; 02< 0 ; fa > 0 ; fa >0 / 0s<O 
Hypotheses seven, eight, and nine are used to form the following equation 
for mission drift. 
Log(Average Loan Balance per Borrower= GJ+ (3/Log(Operational Self-
Sufficiency^ + faLog(Assetsn) + faLog(Cost per Borrowerlt) + 
j3/> 0 ; f a > 0 ; f a > 0  
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Chapter V 
Empirical Results 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical exercise relating to 
economies of scale, determinants of operational self-sustainability and mission 
drift of MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia. Along with the 
regional differences (Asia vs. Latin America), the study also presents empirical 
results of the above mentioned issues with regard to size - small, medium and 
large MFIs separately. The empirical results presented in this chapter are that of a 
fixed effect model; the preferred methodological framework. Similar estimations 
were conducted based on ordinary least squares and random effect model. The 
results of the estimations were tested based on the Hausman test. The Hausman 
test confirmed the fixed effect model to be the most robust model; therefore, for 
the sake of brevity and space conservation solely the fixed effects model results 
are presented. This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 5.1 provides 
descriptive statistics of the data; section 5.2 provides the empirical results of 
economies of scale , section 5.3 provides the empirical results of operational self-
sufficiency; section 5.3; section 5.4 provides the empirical results of mission drift 
and section 5.5 summarises the conclusions of this chapter. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
During the time period 2005 to 2009, the average assets of MFIs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean amounted to $US67 million, as compared with $US62 
million in Asia (Table 5.1.1). However, the standard deviation of assets for MFIs 
in Asia, at SUS375 million, is relatively higher than the $US237 million in Latin 
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America and the Caribbean. This disparity indicates a larger variation in the size 
of MFIs in Asia as compared with Latin America and the Caribbean. The average 
loan balance per borrower of MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean is 
$US1,336, nearly five times that of the $US275 average loan balance per 
borrower in Asia. The higher average loan balance per borrower is an indicator of 
the possibility of mission drift for MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
average number of borrowers per loan officer, defined as the number of active 
borrowers/the number of active loan officers, is considerably higher in Asia than 
in Latin America and the Caribbean at 360 and 291, respectively. The average 
cost per borrower, defined as the operating expense/the number of active 
borrowers, at $US58 for MFIs in Asia, is substantially lower than the $US292 in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. There is, however, relatively higher variation in 
the average cost per borrower in Latin America and the Caribbean compared with 
Asia at $US262 and $US120, respectively. As mentioned in chapter two, the 
densely populated low income areas in Asia allow for loan officers to provide and 
monitor loans at relatively lower costs than loan officers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The dense population in Asia also allows for loan officers in this 
region to service a larger number of borrowers than loan officers in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
The indicators of operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and yield on portfolio 
reveal interesting contrasts in both Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Operational self-sufficiency is a percentage (%), which indicates whether or not 
enough revenue has been earned to cover the microfinance institution's (MFI's) 
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total costs. The OSS of MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean, at 1.16, is 
relatively higher than the 1.10 in MFIs Asia. This indicates thatMFIs in both Asia 
and Latin America and the Caribbean are able to more than cover costs and earn 
sizeable profits through their operating revenues; however, MFIs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are slightly ahead of MFIs in Asia. 
The portfolio yield (income from lending as a proportion of the average 
outstanding portfolio) is relatively higher in Latin America and the Caribbean as 
compared with Asia at 0.36 and 0.30, respectively. This implies that average 
interest rate on micro-credit is relatively higher in Latin America and Caribbean. 
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Table 5.1.1: Descriptive Statistics of MFIs in Sample: Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean: 2005-2009 
Asia 
No Variables Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Obs 
1. Assets (millions) 62 7 6,450 0.00 375 12.17 969 
2. Avg. Loan 
Balance/Borrower 275 149 6,022 5 408 7.32 953 
3. Borrowers/Loan 
Officer 361 255 10,775 9 548 10.94 777 
4. Cost/Borrower 58 30 1,939 0.34 120 10.44 884 
5. OSS 1.10 1.12 4.40 0.01 0.35 1.03 945 
6. Yield 0.30 0.27 0.88 0.00 0.14 1.28 816 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
No Variables Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Obs 
1. Assets (millions) 67 9 3,480 0.07 237 8.92 1112 
2. Avg. Loan 
Balance/Borrower 1,336 745 64,087 73 3,180 13.47 1106 
3. Borrowers/Loan 
Officer 291 258 1,651 13 174. 2.43 1020 
4. Cost/Borrower 200 152 4,836 11 262 11.02 1043 
5. OSS 1.16 1.13 7.20 0.00 0.35 6.76 1073 
6. Yield 0.36 0.31 1.27 0.04 0.18 1.48 1004 
Source: Data collected from the MIX Market Database 
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In order to test for the presence of multicoUinearity correlation coefficients 
amongst the explanatory variables are calculated. Kennedy (2008) indicates that 
correlations need to be in the range of 0.8-0.9 in order to detect the presence of 
collinearity amongst any two variables. As is evident fromTable 5.1.2, none of 
the correlation coefficients are in this range; therefore, multicoUinearity is not a 
factor in this estimation. 
47 
Table 5.1.2: Correlation Coefficients among the Explanatory Variables 
Asia 
Total 
Assets 
Avg. Loan 
Balance/Borrower 
Borrowers/Loan 
Officer Cost/Borrower OSS Yield 
Total Assets 1.000 .113** .222** .134** -.185** -.165** 
Avg. Loan 
Balance/Borrower -.113** 1.000 -.186** .660** .126** -.056 
Borrowers/Loan 
Officer .222** -.186** 1.000 -.504** .227** _ 219** 
Cost/Borrower -.134** .660** -.504** 1.000 _ 190** .438** 
OSS -.185** .126** .227** _190** 1.000 .052 
Yield -.165** -.056 . 219** .438** .052 1.000 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Total 
Assets 
Avg. Loan 
Balance/Borrower 
Borrowers/Loan 
Officer Cost/Borrower OSS Yield 
Total Assets 1.000 .595** .102** 397** 194** -.321** 
Avg. Loan 
Balance/Borrower .595** 1.000 _144** .698** 142** -.680** 
Borrowers/Loan 
Officer .102** _144** 1.000 -.499** -.165** -.176** 
Cost/Borrower .397** .698** - 499** 1.00 -.165** -.181** 
OSS 194** .142** .200** -.165** 1.000 0.13 
Yield -32i** -.680** -.176** - 18i** 0.13 1.000 
** Two-sided Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level 
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5.2 Economies of Scale 
Table 5.2(a) provides the results of the analysis of economies of scale for 
MFIs in Asia. The positive and significant coefficient on the average loan balance 
per borrower confirms, for the full sample of MFIs as well as all sub-sample 
groups, that average costs per borrower tend to increase with the average loan 
balance per borrower. These results are consistent with the results of 
Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda (2008).The analysis also investigates the 
effect of total assets (outreach) on the cost per borrower. The negative and 
significant coefficient of total assets proves and accepts the hypothesis that costs 
per borrower tend to decrease with total assets. With the exception of MFIs 
classified as medium inscale, the results are consistent across all sub-sample 
groups proving that for these MFIs economies of scale does exist. For the MFIs 
classified as having a medium scale the positive and significant coefficient on 
total assets indicates that economies of scale is not present. 
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Table 5.2(a): Analysis of Economies of Scale for MFIs in Asia: 2005 to 2009 
- Fixed Effect Model 
Log (Cost/Borrowerji) 
= 04 + j3iLog(Average Loan Balance/Borrower;,) + /?2Log(Total Assets^) + 
fit 
Exp. Size# 
Variables Sign Full Large Medium Small 
Constant 1.69 0.50 -1.57 5.33 
(0.66)** (0.51) (1.24)* (1.56)*** 
Log(Average Loan 
+ 0.65 0.74 0.52 0.43 Balance/Borrower) 
(0.14)*** (0.07)*** (0.10)*** (0.44)* 
Log (Total Assets) - -0.10 -0.07 0.15 -0.27 
(0.06)* (0.03)** (0.08)* (0.11)** 
Cross-sections 196 91 125 89 
Observations 883 331 323 229 
R-squared 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.92 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.9 0.94 0.87 
Note 1: Figures in brackets are standard errors 
Note 2: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
# The classification of MFIs according to size is based on gross loan portfolio: small (< $4 
million), medium ($4-15 million) and large MFI (>$15 million). 
Table 5.2(b) provides the results on the analysis of economies of scale for 
MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean. In regards to the analysis on the 
average loan balance per borrower, the results are consistent with those found in 
Asia. The positive and significant coefficient indicates that for the full sample of 
MFIs as well as all sub-sample groupsthat cost per borrower tends to increase 
with the average loan balance per borrower. 
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The analysis on the effect of total assets on the cost per borrower for MFIs 
in Latin America and the Caribbean is also similar to what was found in Asia. For 
the full sample of MFIs the negative and significant coefficient on total assets 
indicates that costs per borrower tend to decrease with total assets, proving that 
for these MFIs economies of scale does exist. With the exception of MFIs 
classified as large in scale the results are consistent across all sub-sample groups. 
For the MFIs classified as having a large scalethe coefficient on total assets is 
positive, however is insignificant. 
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Table 5.2(b): Analysis of Economies of Scale for MFIs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: 2005 to 2009 - Fixed Effect Model 
Log (Cost/Borrowerit) 
= QS + /3i Log(Average Loan Balance/Borrowerjt) + ^LogCTotal Assetsjt) + 
f i t  
Variables Sign Full Large Medium Small 
Constant 2.38 -0.48 3.57 1.96 
(0.82)*** (0.55) (0.94)*** (1.23)* 
Log(Average Loan 
+ 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.67 
Balance/Borrower) 
(0.05)*** (0.08)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** 
Log (Total Assets) - -0.10 0.06 -0.10 -0.09 
(0.05)** (0.05) (0.06)** (0.08)* 
Cross-sections 223 96 100 109 
Observations 1043 400 285 358 
R-squared 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.89 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.95 0.90 0.84 
Note 1: Figures in brackets are standard errors 
Note 2: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
# The classification of MFIs according to size is based on gross loan portfolio: small (< $4 
million), medium ($4-15 million) and large MFI (> $15 million). 
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5.3 Operational Self-Sufficiency 
Given that for both regions (Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean) 
there is evidence to support economies of scale by increasing the scale of the 
institution, we proceed to investigate the determinants of operating self-
sufficiency (OSS). As mentioned earlier, OSS is a percentage (%), which 
indicates whether or not sufficient revenue has been earned to cover the 
microfinance institution's (MFI's) total costs - operational expenses, loan loss 
provisions and financial costs.Table 5.3(a) provides the results on the analysis of 
operational self-sufficiency for MFIs in Asia. The results show that for the full 
sample of MFIs, yield on portfolio (interest rates) is positively associated with 
increased operational self-sufficiency. With the exception of MFIs classified as 
large scale institutions, all sub-sample group estimations produce a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the gross portfolio yield. The coefficient on 
the squared value of the gross portfolio yield is negative and significant for the 
full sample of MFIs as well as for MFIs medium in size; indicating that for these 
MFIs there exists a threshold yield (interest rate) that once reached charging 
interest rates any higher could influence operational self-sufficiency 
negatively.These results are consistent with that of Cull, Demirgiic-Kunt and 
Murduch (2007). MFIs that report charging interest rates beyond a threshold value 
run the risk of attracting high risk borrowers that do not expect to repay and 
therefore could potentially attain lower levels of operational self-sufficiency. For 
large and small scale MFIs the coefficient is positive and insignificant. 
The empirical results show that the average loan size per borrower is also 
associated with improved operational self-sufficiency for the full sample of MFIs 
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in Asia as well as all sub-sample groups estimated. A positive and significant 
coefficient indicates that increasing this ratio will lead to increased operational 
self-sufficiency. 
The effect of the average cost per borrower on operational self-sufficiency 
show that for the full sample in Asia, lower costs are associated with increased 
operational self-sufficiency. A negative and significant coefficient on the cost per 
borrower indicates that MFIs that are able to reduce costs will experience an 
increase in operational self-sufficiency. The results are consistent for all sub-
sample groups estimated; indicating that regardless of size operational self-
sufficiency tends to increase as costs per borrower decrease. 
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Table 5.3(a) : Analysis of OSS for MFIs in Asia: 2005 to 2009 - Fixed 
Effects Model 
Operational Self-Sufficiencyit= 05 + /3i (Yields) + /32(Yield2it) + 
/53Log(Borrowers/Loan Officerit) + j84Log(Avg. Loan Balance/Borrowerit) + 
|S5Log(Cost /Borrowerjt) + 6jt 
Exp. Size# 
Variables Sign Full Large Medium Small 
Constant 0.56 -0.46 0.45 -0.46 
(0.27)* (0.44) (0.51) (0.26)* 
Yield + 1.76 0.42 2.83 1.17 
(0.86)* (1.81) (1.68)* (0.60)** 
Yield2 _ -0.83 1.47 -2.80 0.01 
(1.03)* (2.42) (2.14)* (0.64) 
Log(Borrower/Loan 
4" 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.06 Officer) 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) 
Log(Average Loan 
Ral an re/Rnrrnwerl 
+ 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.40 
(0.08)** (0.08)*** (0.08)** (0.06)*** 
Log 
(Cost/Borrower) -0.23 
(0.06)*** 
-0.24 
(0.12)** 
-0.28 -0.29 
(0.07)*** (0.06)*** 
Cross-sections 192 96 112 68 
Observations 750 309 270 171 
R-squared 0.77 0.68 0.84 0.60 
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.53 0.72 0.59 
Note 1: Figures in brackets are standard errors 
Note 2: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
# The classification of MFIs according to size is based on gross loan portfolio: small (< $4 
million), medium ($4-15 million) and large MFI (> $15 million). 
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Table 5.3(b) provides the results on the analysis of operational self-
sufficiency for MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The results show that 
for the full sample of MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as all 
sub-sample groups estimated, raising portfolio yield (interest rates) is associated 
with increased operational self-sufficiency. The coefficient on the squared value 
of the gross portfolio yield is negative and significant for all samplesof MFIs. 
This result is consistent with the full sample and medium sized MFIs in Asia in 
that that there exists a threshold interest rate that once reached charging rates 
above and beyond could influence operational self-sufficiency negatively. 
Consistent with Asia, for the full sample of MFIs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, an increased average loan balance per borrower improves operational 
self-sufficiency. A positive and significant coefficient indicates that increasing 
this ratio will lead to increased operational self-sufficiency. All sub-sample 
groups estimated yield a positive and significant coefficient on the size of the 
average loan balance per borrower. 
For the full sample of MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean cost per 
borrower proves to have a negative effect on the level of operational self-
sufficiency. A negative and significant coefficient indicates that MFIs that are 
able to decrease this ratio will attain higher levels of operational self-
sufficiency. With the exception of MFIs small in scale, all sub-sample groups 
estimated produce a negative and significant coefficient on the cost per borrower. 
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Table 5.3(b) : Analysis of OSS for MFIs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: 2005 to 2009 - Fixed Effects Model 
Operational Self-Sufficiencyit= 04 + /3i (Yield;,) + /32(Yield2jt) + 
j33Log(Borrowers/Loan Officer;,) + /34Log(Avg. Loan Balance/Borrower;,) + 
/35Log(Cost /Borroweri,) + elt 
Exp. Size# 
Variables Sign Full Large Medium Small 
Constant 0.62 0.59 0.10 -1.39 
(0.43) (0.38) (0.60) (1.45) 
Yield + 1.94 
(0.36)*** 
1.63 
(0.47)*** 
1.57 
(0.45)*** 
3.16 
(1.68)* 
Yield2 
-
-0.99 
(0.35)*** 
-0.99 
(0.27)*** 
-0.66 
(0.29)** 
-2.32 
(1.81)* 
Log(Borrower/Loan 
Officer) + 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
Log(Average Loan 
Balance/Borrower) + 0.20 
(0.07)*** 
0.14 
(0.07)** 
0.33 
(0.07)*** 
0.29 
(0.13)** 
Log 
(Cost/Borrower) - -0.26 
(0.15)* 
-0.18 
(0.07)** 
-0.36 
(0.08)*** 
-0.09 
(0.33) 
Cross-sections 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
222 
995 
0.71 
0.62 
95 
388 
0.84 
0.79 
97 
275 
0.84 
0.75 
108 
332 
0.69 
0.53 
Note 1: Figures in brackets are standard errors 
Note 2: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
# The classification of MFIs according to size is based on gross loan portfolio: small (< $4 
million), medium ($4-15 million) and large MFI (> $15 million). 
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5.4 Mission Drift 
Table 5.4(a) provides the results on the analysis of mission drift for MFIs 
in Asia. The results indicate, for the full sample of MFIs, that the average loan 
balance per borrower tends to increase with operational self-sufficiency. The 
results support the hypothesis of the positive relationship between average loan 
balance and profitability. These results are consistent across MFIsof various sizes 
- medium and large.The positive and significant coefficient on operational self-
sufficiency indicates that for these sample groups the size of the average loan 
balance per borrower tends to increase with operational self-sufficiency. This 
result indicates that these MFIs could potentially face a trade-off between serving 
the poorest borrowers and pursuing operational self-sufficiency.For MFIs small in 
size the negative coefficient on operational self-sufficiency indicates that for some 
small scaled MFIsa trade-off may not exist; however, given that this coefficient is 
insignificant there is insufficient evidence to support that a trade-off does not 
exists. 
Total assets is also positively related to the size of the average loan 
indicating that increases in outreach(total assets) tends to have a positive impact 
on the size of the average loan balance. The coefficient on total assets is positive 
and statistically significant for all size groups. This result is consistent with 
Ylinen (2010) indicating that older and more mature MFIs trying to increase 
access to commercial funding may become susceptible to disbursing larger 
average loans. 
The empirical results of the effect of cost per borrower on the average loan 
balance per borrower shows that for the full sample of MFIs average loan size 
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increases with the cost per borrower. This result is consistent with that ofCull, 
Demirgiic-Kunt and Murduch (2007) inthat inefficient MFIs need to shift their 
loan portfolio towards larger average loans (seasoned borrowers). The results are 
consistent across MFI size groups; however, the coefficient for MFIs small in size 
is insignificant. 
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Table 5.4(a): Analysis of Mission Drift for MFIs in Asia: 2005 to 2009 -
Fixed Effects Model 
Log(Average Loan Balance per Borrowerjt) = 05+ /3iLog(Operational 
Self-Sufficiency,,) + /32Log(Assets„) + /33Log(Cost per Borrowerit) + eit 
Size# 
Variables Sign Full Large Medium Small 
Constant 1.80 1.58 -0.18 -0.53 
(0.41)*** (0.82)** (1.93) (0.82) 
Log (OSS) + 0.53 0.51 0.08 -0.33 
(0.12)*** (0.21)** (0.04)* (0.30) 
Log (Total Assets) + 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.38 
(0.02)*** (0.05)* (0.06)** (0.10)*** 
Log (Cost/Borrower) + 0.62 0.65 0.35 0.05 
(0.02)*** (0.06)*** (0.12)*** (0.25) 
Cross-sections 195 97 124 89 
Observations 882 331 322 229 
R-squared 0.59 0.66 0.97 0.95 
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.66 0.95 0.91 
Note 1: Figures in brackets are standard errors 
Note 2: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
# The classification of MFIs according to size is based on gross loan portfolio: small (< $4 
million), medium ($4-15 million) and large MFI (> $15 million). 
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Table 5.4(b) provides the results on the analysis of mission drift for MFIs 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The positive and significant coefficient for 
the full sample of MFIs indicates that the size of the average loan balance per 
borrower increases with operational self-sufficiency. Consistent with Asia, the 
results confirm the hypothesis of the relationship between average loan balance 
and average profit by Freixas and Rochet (2008) and are in-line with the work of 
Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Murduch (2007).For the full sample of MFIs, as well as 
MFIs of medium or small scale, the results indicate that there exists a trade-off 
between serving the poorest borrowers and higher levels of operational self-
sufficiency. For MFIs large in scale the coefficient is positive; however, is 
insignificant. 
The result for the effect of total assets (outreach) on the average loan 
balance is positive and similar with that in Asia. A positive and significant 
coefficient on total assets across all samples estimated indicates that the average 
loan balance per borrower tends to increase with total assets. 
The result for the effect of cost per borrower on the average loan balance 
is also similar to that in Asia. A positive and significant coefficient confirms the 
hypothesis byCull, Demirgiic-Kunt and Murduch (2007) that inefficient MFIs in 
need to shift their loan portfolio towards larger average loans. The result is 
consistent across all size groups. 
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Table 5.4(b): Analysis of Mission Drift for MFIs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: 2005 to 2009 - Fixed Effects Model 
Log(Average Loan Balance per Borrowerjt) = a$+ |8iLog(Operational 
Self-Sufficiencyit) + /32Log(Assetslt) + j33Log(Cost per Borrowerjt) + €jt 
Size# 
Variables Sign Full Large Medium Small 
Constant 0.24 1.22 1.37 0.60 
(0.72) (1.59) (1.28) (1.05) 
Log (OSS) + 0.20 0.02 0.27 0.15 
(0.10)** (0.17) (0.15)* (0.12)*** 
Log (Total Assets) + 0.23 0.14 0.19 0.25 
(0.04)*** (0.08)* (0.07)** (0.07)*** 
Log (Cost/Borrower) + 0.53 0.66 0.41 0.38 
(0.05)*** (0.10)*** (0.15)*** (0.06)*** 
Cross-sections 223 96 100 109 
Observations 1043 400 285 385 
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 
Adjusted R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 
Note 1: Figures in brackets are standard errors 
Note 2: **•,**, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
# The classification of MFIs according to size is based on gross loan portfolio: small (< $4 
million), medium ($4-15 million) and large MFI (> S15 million). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented results on some of the basic questions posed in 
this thesis. Do MFIs exhibit economies of scale in their operations across 
Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean? What are the main determinants 
of financial performance (OSS) of MFIs across the Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean? Is there any evidence of mission drift among MFIs across 
Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean? 
In regards the first question, viz., economies of scale, MFIs in Asia 
and Latin America showed evidence of reaping economies of scale across 
various size groups (small, medium and large). The empirical investigation 
into the determinants of financial performance (OSS) shows that portfolio 
yield (interest rates) and average loan balance per borrower have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on financial performance of MFIs in both 
regions (Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean). In both regions, 
increases in portfolio yield (interest rates) over a certain threshold seem to 
negatively impact financial performance (as revealed by the coefficient on 
yield2). This result is more robust in MFIs across Latin America and 
Caribbean. The cost per borrower has a negative statistically significant 
impact on profitability of MFIs across both regions. 
In regards to mission drift, the empirical evidence shows that mission 
drift is evident among MFIs in both Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. 
The results support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between profitability of an MFI and average loan size. These results are 
similar to the one obtained by Cull et al (2007). 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
This thesis utilized three estimations to address the following 
research questions: (1) do MFIs attain economies of scale as they increase 
their outreach; (2) what are the determinants of self-sustainability of MFIs -
interest rates, repeated loans to seasoned borrowers or costs; and (3) does the 
pursuance of self-sustainability tend to drive microfinance institutions away 
from the poorest borrowers; and if so, is there evidence to support regional 
differences between Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The study 
uses a panel data (unbalanced) set of MFIs of 419 MFIs in Asia and Latin 
America and Caribbean and adopts the robust fixed effects model in the 
empirical investigation. 
The first research question is whether MFIs are able to exploit 
economies of scale over recent years (2005-2009). For both regions the 
average cost per borrower actually increased with the size of the loan, 
indicating that MFIs are not exploiting economies of scale by increasing the 
average loan size. This result is consistent with that of Crombrugghe, 
Tenikue and Sureda (2008) in which they found that costs per borrower 
increase with the average loan balance per borrower as a result of higher 
selection and monitoring required when issuing larger loans.The analysis of 
the effect of total assets on the average cost per borrower also remained 
fairly consistent for MFIs in both Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The negative and significant coefficient indicates that, overall, 
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economies of scale do occur as MFIs increase is size and outreach. 
However, for MFIs in Asia classified as having medium outreach and for 
MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean classified as having large 
sizeoutreach the positive coefficient on total assets indicates that for these 
MFIs the results may not support the existence of economies of scale. 
The second estimation sought to address the research question 
whether microfinance institutions are in fact able to attain operational self-
sufficiency through the pursuance of higher profits. Using yield as the proxy 
for profits the estimations for Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
yielded similar results. The positive and significant coefficient for both 
regions across nearly all sub-sample groups ascertains that charging higher 
interest rates does in fact lead to greater operational self-sufficiency. 
However, the results indicate that for both regions there is evidence to 
support a threshold interest rate that once surpassed could influence 
operational self-sufficiency negatively. As mentioned above, charging rates 
above the threshold value attracts low-quality high-risk borrowers. For both 
regions the results indicate that increasing the size of the average loan 
provided to borrowers could also increase operational self-sufficiency. 
Hence, for both regions the concern is introduced that as MFIs pursue self-
sufficiency it potentially becomes necessary to move away from serving the 
poorest borrowers towards serving wealthier more mature borrowers. The 
results are also consistent in regards to the effect that the average cost per 
borrower has on operational self-sufficiency. The negative and significant 
coefficient for both regions across nearly all samples estimated indicates that 
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MFIs that are able to attain cost-efficiencies are more likely to attain 
operational self-sufficiency. 
The third estimation sought to directly address if MFIs are 
abandoning serving the poorest borrowers in pursuit of self-sufficiency (so 
called mission drift hypothesis). The analysis on the effect of operational 
self-sufficiency on the average loan balance provided to borrowers from 
Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean yielded slightly different results. 
For Latin America and the Caribbean the coefficient on operational self-
sufficiency is positive and significant for all size groups indicating that all 
MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean potentially run the risk of mission 
drift. The positive and significant coefficient on operational self-sufficiency 
indicates that MFIs could potentially face a trade-off between serving the 
poorest borrowers and pursuing operational self-sufficiency. For MFIs in 
Asia the results indicate that MFIs classified as small in size may not be at 
risk of mission drift. The negative coefficient on operational self-sufficiency 
indicates that for these MFIs there may not be sufficient evidence to support 
that a trade-off exists. The result of the effect of total assets on the size of 
the average loan provided to borrowers is similar for both regions. The 
positive and significant coefficient indicates that as MFIs increase in size 
and outreach they potentially run the risk of mission drift. The result of the 
effect of the average cost per borrower on the average loan balance per 
borrower is also similar for both Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The positive and significant coefficient on the average cost per borrower 
66 
indicates that MFIs with higher costs could potentially fall victim to mission 
drift. 
Overall, the results indicate that MFIs do attain higher levels of 
operational self-sufficiency through the pursuance of increased profitability. 
The results also indicate that more cost-efficient MFIs will be more likely to 
attain operational self-sufficiency as opposed to those MFIs that are less 
cost-efficient. However, contradictory to what existing literature suggests, 
MFIs in neither Asia nor Latin American and the Caribbean seem to be 
targeting wealthier clients in an attempt to exploit economies of scale. 
Rather,the results suggest that by increasing the overall size and outreach of 
the institution MFIs are able to attain cost-efficiencies. Therefore, rather 
than focussing on increasing individual loan size focus should be paid to 
increasing outreach (especially bringing ultra-poor into the ambit of the 
program). 
As mentioned above, the results indicate that all MFIs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are potentially at risk of mission drift while 
pursuing higher profitability in an attempt to attain operational self-
sufficiency. However, consistent with existing literature, the results indicate 
that not all MFIs in Asia will be at risk of mission drift while pursuing the 
same conditions. As mention above, MFIs classified as small in scale may 
not be at risk. The deviation in results could potentially be due to the 
variation in existing economic and socio-economic structure between the 
two regions. As noted, the gross domestic product per capita in Latin 
America is nearly six times that of South Asia. Also, due to 
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theunderdeveloped financial system MFIs in Latin America have become 
attractive sources of funding for unbanked wealthier clients in the region. As 
a result, MFIs in this region are susceptible to cross-subsidization lending 
leading to vulnerability of mission drift. MFIs in both Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean are susceptible to mission drift as the outreach 
of the MFI or the cost of providing loans increases. However, for all MFIsin 
consideration the size of the coefficient on the cost per borrower outweighs 
that of both operational self-sufficiency and total assets indicating that MFIs 
that are more cost efficient could potentially avoid mission drift. This result 
is consistent with the work of Mersland and Strom (2010) which implies that 
when an MFI is run more efficiently, the MFIs able to reduce average loan 
size and potentially prevent mission drift. 
Overall microfinance is following a troubling trend. From a policy 
perspective, in order to outright prevent mission drift increased regulation is 
required. However, given that typically the increased costs associated with 
introducing new regulation gets passed on to the borrowers this may not be 
the best solution. 
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Appendix 1 
Country % Households with Access to a Bank Account 
Asia 
Singapore 98 
Bangladesh 32 
Pakistan 11 
Sri Lanka 59 
India 48 
Thailand 59 
Philippines 26 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Mexico 44.1 
Brazil 39.7 
Columbia 39.2 
Peru 4.5 
Ecuador 35 
Bolivia 9.9 
Paraguay 3.7 
Guatemala 17.8 
Panama 35.2 
Source: The World Bank 
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